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Abstract 
 
Cooperation is a fundamental drive of moral behavior from infancy, yet competitive 
intergroup contexts can exert a significant influence on resource allocation behavior in 
childhood. The present study explored how ingroup and outgroup norms of competition and 
cooperation influenced the allocation of resources between groups among children and 
adolescents, along with how they reasoned about these allocations. Ingroup norms combined, 
for the first time, with outgroup norms were manipulated to examine their effect on the 
development of intergroup resource allocation. Participants aged 8 to 16-years (n = 229) were 
told that their ingroup and the outgroup held either a competitive or cooperative norm about 
how they should behave in an arts competition. They then allocated tokens for expenditure in 
the competition between the two teams, and provided social reasoning to justify their chosen 
allocations. Results showed a negative outgroup norm of competition lead to significantly 
more ingroup bias when the ingroup also held a competitive rather than a cooperative norm. 
In contrast, a positive outgroup norm of cooperation did not result in significantly less 
ingroup bias when the ingroup also held a cooperative norm. Additionally adolescents, unlike 
children who allocated equally were more likely to make reference to fair competition, a form 
of moral reasoning, in the competitive compared to the cooperative ingroup norm condition. 
This study showed that children and adolescents considered both ingroup and outgroup 
norms simultaneously when making intergroup resource allocations, but that only adolescents 
varied their reasoning to justify these allocation in line with group norms.  
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Group norms, intergroup resource allocation and reasoning among children and adolescents 
 
Resource distribution involves basic moral considerations, including judgments about 
the fair treatment of others, making it central to the development of morality. Allocation of 
resources is one way children show evidence of cooperative behavior involving basic moral 
considerations about fairness, equality and concern for others (Killen & Smetana, 2015; 
Piaget, 1952; Turiel, 1983). A longstanding line of research has demonstrated that from 
infancy, humans show a strong desire to cooperate with others (Killen & de Waal, 2000; 
Smetana & Turiel, 2003; Tomasello & Vaish, 2013), reflecting a generic moral norm (a 
society wide directive regarding moral behavioral expectations) in human cultures. This 
generic moral norm has been shown to influence children’s resource allocation, evaluation of 
ingroup members, and is reflected in the cooperation seen amongst human infants (Hamann, 
Warneken, Greenberg, & Tomasello, 2011; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). Yet, societal 
moral expectations about cooperation are not the only influence children consider when 
allocating resources, especially in intergroup contexts when social categories (e.g., gender, 
ethnicity) and social comparisons are salient. 
In intergroup contexts, according to the Social Reasoning Developmental (SRD) 
approach (Killen & Rutland, 2011; Rutland & Killen, 2017; Rutland, Killen, & Abrams, 
2010), judgments around resource allocation involve more than generic moral norms. The 
SRD perspective contends that group norms shared among peers are also part of the 
deliberations concerning who gets what. Children's decisions and reasoning are not only 
influenced by generic moral norms of cooperation but also demonstrate concern about the 
implications of their decisions for their social group; including how a decision might fit with 
belonging to a group and showing group loyalty (see Rutland & Killen, 2017). The SRD 
approach emphasizes the role of both ingroup and outgroup norms, which are shared 
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conventions within social groups of peers, in defining how children and adolescents should 
allocate and reason about resource allocation. Developmental research shows that from 
approximately seven years of age children understand that loyalty to one's group norms is 
expected to gain social acceptance and avoid social exclusion from the group (Killen, 
Rutland, Abrams, Mulvey, & Hitti, 2013; Rutland, Hitti, Mulvey, Abrams, & Killen, 2015).  
Research on resource allocation suggests that children from the age of five typically 
favor cooperation, defend the entitlements of their peers (Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 
2013) and show a persistent concern for fair exchange throughout childhood (Dawes, Fowler, 
Johnson, McElreath, & Smirnov, 2007; Shaw & Olson, 2012). Thus, a group norm of 
cooperation is often salient during resource allocation reflecting the generic societal moral 
norm (Hamann et al., 2011; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011). Yet peer ingroup and outgroup 
social norms are not always cooperative and peer groups do sometimes advocate for 
competition within competitive intergroup resource allocation scenarios, from seven years 
onwards (Dejesus, Rhodes, & Kinzler, 2014; Shaw, DeScioli, & Olson, 2012).   
In the present research we examined the influence of peer group norms in an 
intergroup context on the development of children and adolescents' allocation of resources 
between their own group and other groups. Developmental research has made salient 
competitive contexts, in which it is assumed both the ingroup and outgroup hold a 
competitive norm and showed that in these contexts, among children from approximately 
seven years of age, outgroup prosociality decreases and intergroup bias increases (Abrams, 
Rutland, & Cameron, 2003; Abrams, Van de Vyver, Pelletier, & Cameron, 2015; Spielman, 
2000; Zhu, Guan, & Li, 2015). Yet the ingroup and outgroup norm are not always the same in 
intergroup contexts. For example, an outgroup holding a competitive norm should facilitate 
ingroup bias but this may depend on whether the ingroup norm is competitive or cooperative. 
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Therefore, for the first time, in this study we manipulated both ingroup and outgroup norms 
of competition and cooperation in the context of an intergroup resource allocation task.  
In the present study we go beyond previous research by examining whether the effect 
of an outgroup norm on the development of intergroup resource allocation between eight and 
sixteen years is moderated by the ingroup norm. Developmental research has found, among 
six to nine year old children with the necessary social perspective taking ability to attend to 
multiple group perceptions (Abrams, Rutland, Pelletier, & Ferrell, 2009), that a negative 
outgroup threat increases intergroup bias significantly more so when the ingroup holds a 
negative exclusion norm rather than a positive inclusion norm (Nesdale, Maass, Durkin, & 
Griffiths, 2005). We expect to find that a negative outgroup norm of competition will result 
in significantly more ingroup biased resource allocation when the ingroup also holds a 
competitive rather than a cooperative norm. 
Other developmental intergroup research has also shown that outgroup norms have a 
significant effect on ingroup bias. This research has indicated that positive outgroup norms of 
friendship, among children from seven years onwards, significantly reduce intergroup biases 
through direct or extended intergroup contact (Cameron, Rutland, & Hossain, 2011; Feddes, 
Noack, & Rutland, 2009; Turner, Hewstone, Voci, & Vonofakou, 2008). We therefore 
anticipate that a positive outgroup norm of cooperation will result in significantly less 
ingroup biased resource allocation when the ingroup also holds a cooperative rather than a 
competitive norm.  
The present study also, for the first time, examined the influence of group norms on 
children and adolescents' social reasoning when justifying their intergroup resource allocation 
decisions. Social domain theory (SDT) contends that children actively reason about social 
relations, whilst simultaneously considering the moral, social-conventional, and 
psychological domains (Turiel, 1983). Research on developmental intergroup processes (e.g. 
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Hitti & Killen, 2015), drawing from the social reasoning developmental (SRD) model (Killen 
& Rutland, 2011; Rutland & Killen, 2017; Rutland et al., 2010), has focused on reasoning 
about fairness, whilst expanding the notion of social-conventional reasoning to include a 
focus on group identity, group dynamics and group norms. We used this model to analyze the 
social reasoning used by children and adolescents to justify their intergroup resource 
allocations.  
There is reason to expect that social reasoning justifications will be influenced by the 
ingroup norm but not the outgroup norm. Individuals within an intergroup context must 
justify their resource allocation decisions to their ingroup in order to retain ingroup 
membership and avoid social exclusion from their group (Rutland et al., 2015). This is not 
the case with the outgroup norm since individuals do not have to maintain social 
identification with the outgroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and are less concerned about social 
exclusion from an outgroup (Killen & Rutland, 2011).  
We expect, when there is an ingroup cooperative norm, that participants will use 
significantly more moral reasoning (e.g., it should be fair and each group should have equal 
rights) to justify an equal allocation of resources since this form of reasoning is likely to be 
welcomed by a cooperative ingroup. In contrast we do not anticipate an effect of a 
competitive ingroup norm on the use of social-conventional reasoning. Given the age of our 
sample they should possess the social acumen and concern about self-presentation required to 
avoid overly justifying intergroup bias with explicit reference to ingroup superiority (Nesdale, 
2013; Rutland, 2013; Rutland, Cameron, Milne, & McGeorge, 2005). 
We do expect the effect of a cooperative ingroup norm on participants' moral 
reasoning when justifying equal resource allocation decisions to be more pronounced among 
adolescents compared to children. Recent developmental research has shown from 
approximately eleven years of age individuals develop a better understanding of group 
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dynamics and how deviance from the group norm results in social exclusion from the group 
(Killen, Rutland, Abrams, Mulvey, & Hitti, 2013; Mulvey, Hitti, Rutland, Abrams, & Killen, 
2014; Rutland et al., 2015). Further, by adolescence individuals are increasingly sensitive to 
other's emotions and being socially excluded by peers (Gieling, Thijs, & Verkuyten, 2010; 
Somerville, 2013). These developmental shifts mean adolescents are more likely than 
children to adapt their reasoning to fit with the ingroup norm of cooperation and thus avoid 
social exclusion.  
  In this study, group norms were predicted to influence children and adolescents' 
intergroup resource allocations and reasoning. Yet it was possible a reverse process, namely 
social projection, would occur, with individuals expecting the attitudes of others within social 
groups to be similar to their own attitudes (Robbins & Krueger, 2005). Social projection is a 
psychological tendency, when what others think is not always crystal clear, to use the self as 
a heuristic to make group judgments and project self-attributes onto a group. Developmental 
research has shown children show this egocentric bias as young as six years (Abrams, 2011; 
Higgins, Feldman, & Ruble, 1980). The inability to decenter and take the social perspective 
of others may make children particularly vulnerable to social projection (Wetzel & Walton, 
1985), though recent research has shown social projection still exists in adolescence (Thijs & 
Verkuyten, 2016).  
 A simulated or 'quasi' minimal competitive intergroup context was used within this 
study, meaning there was no history of group norms and, therefore, a degree of uncertainty 
about the beliefs of each group. This allowed us to manipulate the group norms but also 
opened up the possibility of social projection. For example, given a competitive intergroup 
context, children may find it hard to believe it when told either the ingroup or outgroup thinks 
groups should cooperate, and thus project their own competitive attitudes onto others. 
Therefore in this study we included a specific question to determine whether participants 
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were displaying social projection. This question asked participants what they thought the 
group thought rather than simply checking their memory for what they were told the group 
thought. Individuals who socially projected were expected to state they thought the group 
would think counter to what they were told the group would think. Participants who socially 
projected were excluded from the analyses to ensure that any differences in allocation or 
reasoning reflected the influence of the manipulated group norms rather than any individual's 
propensity to socially project.  
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were three hundred and sixteen (Female, n = 164; Male, n = 152) British 
individuals from lower to middle socioeconomic status (SES) backgrounds, aged 8 to 16 
years (M = 11.54, SD = 2.56). Two age groups were included: children (n = 190, 8–11 years, 
M = 9.56, SD = .76) and adolescents (n = 127, 13–16 years, M = 14.50, SD = .89). Power 
analysis for an ANOVA with 8 groups was conducted in G*Power to determine a sufficient 
sample size using an alpha of 0.05, a power of 0.95, and a medium effect size (f  = 
.025) (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Based on these assumptions, the desired 
sample size was 210 participants. More children than adolescents were initially sampled to 
account for the possibility they would show greater social projection due to egocentric biases 
and, therefore, be excluded from the analyses. Eighty-seven participants met the criteria for 
social projection (adolescents, n = 29; children, n = 58). Participants lived in an ethnically 
diverse metropolitan area consisting of 29.4% White British, 28.5% Black British, 12.3% 
dual heritage, 9.3% Southeast Asian British, and 9.7% other ethnic groups. The ethnic 
makeup of our sample reflected this, with 24.1% White British, 26.9% Black British, 16.5% 
Southeast Asian British, 11.4% dual heritage, 7.6% other ethnic groups, with 13.6% of 
participants opting to withhold ethnic information. 
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Procedure 
 Initially, ingroup affiliation was manipulated using a simulated or 'quasi' minimal 
procedure (McGuire, Rutland, & Nesdale, 2015; Nesdale, Durkin, Maass, Kiesner, & 
Griffiths, 2008). Participants were told they would take part in an inter-school drawing 
competition and that they were members of the ‘excellent’ drawing team, as 'judged' by a 
local artist, who they were lead to believe had assessed their artwork. They were placed in a 
high status group to reflect the fact that most intergroup bias is shown by high status ingroups 
towards low status outgroups (Nesdale & Dalton, 2011; Nesdale & Lawson, 2011). 
Participants were shown counterbalanced pictures of two children from their own team, 
marked as “Excellent Team" and three members of their opposing team, marked as “Good 
Team”. All pictures were matched for participant age and gender. They were told the 
outgroup had been 'judged' to be ‘good’ drawers, albeit not as good as their own team.  
 Ingroup norm manipulation. Group norms were manipulated in line with previous 
studies on children's intergroup attitudes (Nesdale & Dalton, 2011; Nesdale & Lawson, 2011). 
We also conducted a preliminary study that demonstrated the significant influence of our 
norm manipulation1. Children were randomly allocated to the ingroup and outgroup norm 
conditions. Participants were presented with either a competitive or cooperative ingroup 
norm via a ‘secret message’ from an ingroup member.  
 Participants read the following message: “Hello, we’re really happy you’re going to 
be on our team for this drawing competition. We just have one rule if you’re going to be on 
our team, and that is; (Competitive) …if you want to be part of the team, you should try and 
                                                        
1 In a preliminary study to test the effectiveness of our ingroup norm manipulation, children (n = 32, 8 – 11 
years) and adolescents (n = 55, 13 – 14 years) were inducted in to simulated groups using the same drawing 
competition methodology used in the present study, and presented with an ingroup norm of cooperation or 
competition, or no norm in a control condition. We asked participants to distribute 10 tokens between their team 
and the other team. There was a significant interaction between Age and Ingroup Norm (p < .001). Children 
responded to an ingroup norm of competition by allocating significantly more resources to their ingroup (p 
< .001) compared with a control condition. By comparison, adolescents showed significantly less bias in their 
allocations in the cooperative ingroup norm, versus control condition (p = .01). This preliminary study 
established that the ingroup competitive and cooperative norm manipulation used in the present study had a 
significant effect on resource allocation among children and adolescents respectively. 
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make our team win, don’t share with other teams, and don’t support the other team in the 
competition. We want to win the competition. (or, Cooperative) …if you want to be part of 
our team you have to act kindly toward all other members of other teams, share with them 
and support them in the competition. We want everyone to have fun and be included…I hope 
you like being a member of the excellent drawing team, good luck!” 
 The ingroup norm manipulation was followed by a social projection assessment 
question; “Does your team want to share with other teams?” (Yes/No).  
Outgroup norm manipulation. The outgroup norm was manipulated by informing 
participants that their team had overheard an outgroup member discussing how they were 
going to behave in the competition. They either read a cooperative outgroup norm: “We want 
everyone in the competition to have a good time and work together. It would be unfair if one 
team had more than anyone else. Let’s try our best, but it doesn’t matter if we don’t win!” or 
a competitive outgroup norm: “We want to win the competition, we’re not bothered about the 
other team! We want to get the most out of all the teams. The most important thing to us is 
winning!” This was followed by a second social projection question; “Does the other team 
care about winning the competition?” (Yes/No). 
 Measures. Next participants were asked to imagine that they had 10 tokens, with a 
monetary value of £10 and that they could exchange these tokens for art materials that their 
team could use in the drawing competition. They were asked to divide these between the two 
teams. To assess social reasoning, participants were asked 'Why?' they choose their 
allocations. All measures were completed individually on a laptop or tablet computer on 
Qualtrics.   
Data Preparation 
 Intergroup bias was determined by how many tokens participants allocated to their 
own team. Social reasoning was coded independently by two coders using categories drawn 
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from Social Domain Theory and previous research on intergroup relations (Killen et al., 
2013). Responses were coded as (1) moral (references to justice, fairness or equality, e.g. 
"because it’s the fair thing to do"), (2) group functioning (references to group norms, group 
loyalty or winning the competition, e.g. “our team can use it to buy more resources”, or (3) 
personal choice (references to personal autonomy, e.g. "It’s my decision what to do with the 
tokens"). Responses that did not fit in to one of these three conceptual categories were coded 
as “other”. Analysis of agreement between two coders across 25% of the responses for each 
question revealed strong inter-rater reliability (κ = .80, p < .001).  
 Participants were considered to have displayed social projection if they answered 
either social projection question counter to the group norm manipulation. For example, a 
participant was excluded if they said their team wanted to share resources when they were 
told their team held a competitive norm. Similarly, a participant was excluded if they said the 
outgroup cared about winning when they were informed that the outgroup held a cooperative 
norm. Eighty-seven participants met the criteria for social projection. This group comprised 
58 children and 29 adolescents (see supplementary materials for a complete breakdown by 
condition). Analyses were conducted with the full sample, revealing no significant results. 
Following this, participants who answered the social projection question incorrectly were 
omitted from the final analyses. The analyses reported here included a sample of 229 
participants (children, n = 131; adolescents, n = 98). 
Results 
Resource Allocation 
 The number of tokens allocated to the ingroup was entered into a 2 (Age; Children, 
Adolescents) x 2 (Ingroup norm; Competitive, Cooperative) x 2 (Outgroup norm; 
Competitive, Cooperative) ANOVA. There were no significant main effects or interactions 
involving Age, and therefore it was excluded from further analysis. As expected, there was a 
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significant interaction between Ingroup norm and Outgroup norm, F(1, 211) = 4.56, p = .03, 
η2  = .02.  
 Post-hoc simple effects comparisons were carried out to determine the influence of 
outgroup norm at each level of ingroup norm (see Figure 1). It was found, as expected, that 
when the outgroup norm was competitive and ingroup norm competitive participants 
allocated significantly more resources to the ingroup than when the outgroup norm was also 
competitive but the ingroup norm cooperative; t(116) = 2.09, p = .04, d = 0.38), see Table 1. 
When the outgroup norm was competitive and the ingroup competitive participants allocated 
marginally more resources to the ingroup than when the outgroup norm was cooperative but 
the ingroup norm was also competitive; t(107) = 1.88, p = .06, d = 0.36, see Table 1..  
 However, contrary to our prediction, there was not significantly less ingroup bias in 
allocation when the outgroup was cooperative and the ingroup cooperative compared to when 
the outgroup was also cooperative but the ingroup competitive, t(108) = -1.20, p = .23. In 
addition, participants in the competitive ingroup norm and competitive outgroup norm 
condition did not allocate significantly more resources to the ingroup compared with those in 
the cooperative ingroup norm and cooperative outgroup norm condition; t(102) = 0.63, p 
= .53. One sample t-tests indicated that for all four crossed ingroup norm/outgroup norm 
conditions, significant in-group bias was observed at the p < .001 level compared with a 
criterion level of 5 tokens (see supplementary materials for results from all additional tests 
conducted). 
Resource Allocation Reasoning  
Not all participants who allocated tokens provided a social reasoning justification (n = 
190 for social reasoning analysis). Those participants who did provide a social reasoning 
justification for their allocation were further divided based upon their chosen allocation 
strategy. Participants who allocated equally (5 tokens to the ingroup, and 5 to the outgroup, n 
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= 97), or gave more to the outgroup (n = 4), were coded as “equality” strategists (n = 101), 
whilst those who allocated 6 or more tokens to their ingroup were coded as “ingroup servers" 
(n = 89). Participants who used an “other” response were omitted from the analyses (n = 15). 
Given a small cell size, participants who used personal choice justifications (n = 5) were 
omitted from analyses. Resource allocation reasoning data was analyzed using a multinomial 
logistic regression model. We modelled the interaction effect of Age Group (Adolescents, 
Children), Allocation Strategy (Equality, Ingroup Serving) and Ingroup Norm (Competitive, 
Cooperative) on reasoning style across three conceptual categories.  
Addition of the predictors to the model led to a significant improvement in model fit, 
LR χ2(6, N = 170) = 72.04, Nagelkerke R2 = .51, p < .001. The effect of strategy was 
significant, χ2(2, N = 170) = 69.03, p < .001. Moral reasoning justifications were more likely 
to be used than group functioning justifications by equality strategists compared with ingroup 
servers, β = -4.08, χ2(1) = 34.60, p < .001, Exp(B) = .02, 95% CI [.004, .07]. Similarly, the 
effect of age was significant, χ2(2, N = 170) = 6.15, p = .05. Moral reasoning justifications 
were more likely to be used than group functioning justifications by adolescent participants 
compared with children, β = -1.36, χ2(1) = 5.36, p = .02, Exp(B) = .26, 95% CI [.08, .81]. 
There was no significant effect of ingroup norm (p = .13). Addition of the significant 
interaction term between strategy and age did not significantly improve the fit of the model 
(Nagelkerke R2 = .49). 
Given that moral domain reasoning was the predominant category used, we sought to 
observe whether the specific styles of moral reasoning used by adolescents and children 
differed. Moral responses were further sub-coded as (1) fairness (references to generic 
fairness, e.g. "because it’s the fair thing to do"), (2) equality (references to the need to 
distribute the resources using an equality principle, e.g. " because everybody should have 
their tokens split equally"), and (3) fair competition (references to the need to ensure both 
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teams have equal opportunities in the competition, e.g. "so both teams have an equal chance 
of winning"). We modelled the interaction effect of Age Group (Adolescents, Children), 
Allocation Strategy (Equality, Ingroup Serving) and Ingroup Norm (Competitive, 
Cooperative) on reasoning style across these three conceptual categories, as well as group 
functioning. Personal choice reasoning was again omitted due to a small cell size. 
Addition of the interaction term between age group, strategy and ingroup norm to the 
model led to a significant improvement in model fit, LR χ2(21, N = 170) = 102.30, 
Nagelkerke R2 = .55, p < .001. Given some small cell sizes (n < 5), we used Fisher’s exact 
tests and follow up z tests with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons to examine 
differences in Resource Allocation reasoning as a function of Age, Ingroup Norm and 
Strategy. There were significant differences in reasoning style as a function of age amongst 
equality strategists when the ingroup norm was competitive (Fisher’s exact = 10.62, p = .003). 
Adolescents who allocated equally against a competitive ingroup norm justified this behavior 
differently than children who did the same. Reported means represent percentage proportions 
of reasoning within the age group. 
Children who allocated equally in the competitive ingroup norm condition were more 
likely to make reference to Fairness (M = .39) and Equality (M = .32) than Fair Competition 
(M = .29). Participants who referenced Fairness argued that their allocation strategy was “fair 
and not biased”. Those who referenced Equality justified their strategy with reference to the 
importance of equality, “because we all need the same amount”. By comparison, adolescents 
who allocated equally in the competitive ingroup norm condition were more likely to make 
reference to Fair Competition (M = .90) than Fairness (M = .10). All differences reported 
were significant at the p < .05 level.  
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Discussion 
This study, for the first time, manipulated both ingroup and outgroup norms of 
competition and cooperation in the context of an intergroup resource allocation task. In line 
with the Social Reasoning Developmental (SRD) approach this study showed both peer 
ingroup and outgroup norms influenced children and adolescents’ intergroup resource 
allocations. As expected, an outgroup norm of competition lead to significantly more ingroup 
bias when the ingroup also held a competitive rather than a cooperative norm. Though, 
counter to our prediction, a positive outgroup norm of cooperation did not result in 
significantly less ingroup bias when the ingroup also held a cooperative rather than a 
competitive norm. It was also found, as expected, that adolescents who allocated equally in 
the competitive compared to the cooperative ingroup norm condition used more varied moral 
domain reasoning than children to justify this challenge to normative behavior.  
The valence of the outgroup and ingroup norms seemed to influence whether they 
significantly impacted intergroup resource allocations; since a negative outgroup norm 
combined with a negative ingroup norm significantly increased bias while a positive 
outgroup norm together with a positive ingroup norm didn't significantly decrease bias. 
While negative outgroup and ingroup norms seem to increase bias, it appears harder to reduce 
ingroup bias with joint positive outgroup and ingroup norms. This may be explained by the 
well known 'negativity bias' in how adults process their experience (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001), and children make sense of the social-emotional world (Vaish, 
Grossmann, & Woodward, 2008). Either our children and adolescents paid more attention to 
the negative compared to positive group norms or, alternatively, a mutually cooperative 
situation between the groups was simply not believable during an intergroup competition, 
even though our participants included in the analysis appeared to not demonstrate social 
projection.  
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Future research on the influence of group norms on resource allocation should 
investigate the role of valence and whether other positive norms (e.g., inclusion or fairness) 
can similarly influence intergroup behavior. Other specifics of the norm manipulation may 
also influence children's resource allocations. For example, recent resource allocation studies 
have explored how the relative need of an outgroup can influence allocation (Elenbaas, Rizzo, 
Cooley, & Killen, 2016). It is possible that a cooperation norm from a disadvantaged 
outgroup who are in need may drive participants to favor an outgroup. 
Interestingly, we observed a marginal reduction in ingroup biased resource allocation 
when the outgroup advocated for cooperation, even when the ingroup norm was competitive, 
compared with a situation where both group norms were competitive. This is further evidence 
to the point that children and adolescents consider not only their ingroup norm, but also the 
norms of other recipients in resource allocation situations. Children respond to negative 
outgroup information (Nesdale et al., 2005) and yet less is known about the effects of 
exposure to a positive cooperation outgroup norm in relation to a competitive ingroup norm. 
It is possible that an outgroup cooperation norm serves as a reminder of the importance of 
generic societal cooperation, which in turn leads to a reduction in ingroup bias. Whilst this 
effect was marginal, this in itself is not surprising given the power of ingroup norms for 
children and adolescents (McGuire et al., 2015; Nesdale et al., 2008). Future work exploring 
the more positive potential influence of outgroup information will be an important line of 
enquiry.  
A central aim of the present study was to examine the extent to which children and 
adolescents considered multiple group norms when allocating resources and justifying these 
allocations. As such, it was crucial that participants believed the group norm that was 
communicated to them via the experimental manipulation. This is why we excluded eighty-
seven participants from analyses who showed social projection. One possibility is that a 
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developing understanding of advanced social perspective taking ability, which is known to 
develop into adolescence (Killen et al., 2013; Rutland et al., 2015), is important if individuals 
are to become capable of not projecting their personal thoughts onto the group. In this study, 
a simple one-item social projection measure was utilized. Future work in this area should 
seek to utilize a social projection measure in conjunction with a measure of social perspective 
taking ability (see Abrams, 2011).  
In the present work we sought to examine the influence of ingroup and outgroup 
norms, yet there were subtle differences in the ingroup and outgroup norms due to their 
method of delivery. Ingroup norms were direct prescriptions from an ingroup norm member 
and therefore took a more directive format. Outgroup norms were ‘overheard’ by an ingroup 
member and were therefore less directive. Future research should seek to replicate the 
findings of this study with matched group norms (i.e., both direct prescribed norms from a 
group member) and examine different conditions under which the ingroup or outgroup norm 
might take precedence. Group norms weren't the only salient norms since our participants 
were all in a school context in which a generic moral norm for cooperation was most likely 
salient. There are also contexts when this generic moral norm is less salient (e.g., competitive 
sporting events). Therefore, future research should explicitly manipulate the generic 
normative context alongside peer group norms, and observe how the two interact. 
In summary, to our knowledge this is the first study demonstrating that intergroup 
resource allocation and reasoning amongst children and adolescents are influenced by both 
ingroup and outgroup norms. This is compatible with developmental research on intergroup 
attitudes (McGuire et al., 2015; Nesdale et al., 2005), which has shown children's 
consideration of multiple norms influences their intergroup attitudes. This study showed that 
from eight years old, participants displayed the most ingroup biased resource allocation when 
both the ingroup and outgroup peer norms promoted competition. Moreover, we found that 
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with age participants varied their moral reasoning depending on the prevalent peer group 
norm. These findings are in accordance with a Social Reasoning Developmental model of 
intergroup decision making (Killen & Rutland, 2011; Rutland & Killen, 2017; Rutland et al., 
2010), and extend previous findings on intergroup resource allocation by demonstrating that 
from middle childhood individuals can and do consider multiple normative influences when 
allocating resources and navigating the complex world of intergroup relations.   
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Figure 1. Mean number of tokens allocated to the ingroup as a function of ingroup norm and 
outgroup norm condition (with standard error bars)  
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Table 1 
 
Means and Standard Deviations for Resource Allocation as a function of Ingroup 
and Outgroup Norm Conditions 
  
Competitive Ingroup 
Norm 
 
Cooperative Ingroup 
Norm 
 
Competitive Outgroup 
Norm 
 
6.89 (2.21) 
 
6.11 (1.85) 
 
 
Cooperative Outgroup 
Norm 
 
 
6.13 (2.01) 
 
 
6.60 (2.46) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
